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JURISDICTION STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(h)
(2008).

ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in finding a material change in
circumstance sufficient to then determine it was in the best interests of the minor children
that they have parent-time with Autem in Moab?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A court's legal conclusion as to whether a material change in circumstances has
occurred that would warrant reconsidering the divorce decree is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion." Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290,121, 989 P.2d 491, 497, quoting

Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 912 (Utah App. 1995). Such will not be overturned "unless
the action [the District Court] takes is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse of
discretion."

Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 161, (Utah App 1989).

Factual

findings not challenged on appeal are accepted as true for purposes of an appeal.

Grindstajf v. Grinstaff, 2010 UT App 261, 12, 241 P.3d 365 (memorandum decision).
An appellate court "will not reverse a ruling of the trial court that rests on
independent alternative grounds where the appellant challenges only one of those
grounds." Salt Lake County v. Butler, Crockett, & Walsh Dev. Corp., 2013 UT App 30, 1
28, 297 P .3d 3 8 (internal citations omitted).
This Court may affirm the District Court's decision:

1

if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record,
even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court
to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such
ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not
raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower
court. Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ,r 10, 52 P.3d 1158 (internal citations
omitted).
STATUTES

In addition to § 30-3-37, Utah Code § 30-3-33(9) and § 30-3-34(2) inform on the
appropriateness of parent time arrangements entered under§ 30-3-37.
§ 30-3-33(9)

The court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably accommodate
the distance between the parties and the expense of exercising parent-time.
§ 30-3-34(2)

The advisory guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 and the parent-time schedule as
provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5 shall be presumed to be in the best interests
of the child unless the court determines that Section 30-3-35.1 should apply. The parenttime schedule shall be considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial
parent and the child shall be entitled unless a parent can establish otherwise by a
preponderance of the evidence that more or less parent-time should be awarded based
upon any of the following criteria:
(a) parent-time would endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair the
child's emotional development;
(b) the distance between the residency of the child and the noncustodial parent;
(c) a substantiated or unfounded allegation of child abuse has been made;

., .• .,., •. .,.
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(d) the lack of demonstrated parenting skills without safeguards to ensure the child's
well-being during parent-time;
(e) the financial inability of the noncustodial parent to provide adequate food and shelter
for the child during periods of parent-time;
(f) the preference of the child if the court determines the child to be of sufficient maturity;

(g) the incarceration of the noncustodial parent in a county jail, secure youth corrections
facility, or an adult corrections facility;
(h) shared interests between the child and the noncustodial parent;
(i) the involvement or lack of involvement of the noncustodial parent in the school,
community, religious, or other related activities of the child;

G) the availability of the noncustodial parent to care for the child when the custodial
parent is unavailable to do so because of work or other circumstances;
(k) a substantial and chronic pattern of missing, canceling, or denying regularly
scheduled parent-time;
(1) the minimal duration of and lack of significant bonding in the parents' relationship

prior to the conception of the child;
(m) the parent-time schedule of siblings;
(n) the lack of reasonable alternatives to the needs of a nursing child; and
(o) any other criteria the court determines relevant to the best interests of the child.

ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE.
l.
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NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a post-divorce matter about the location and quantity of parent-time for
three boys, ages 12, 8, and 6 with their mother, Autem Hirschfield. Mr. Jones believes
participation in extra-curricular and peer activities is more important than parent-time
with Autem and that traveling to Moab twice a month is harmful to the children. Autem
believes every other weekend visitation with her is essential to their development and
more meaningful than any extra-curricular or peer activity and that the travel burden on
the boys is no greater than contemplated by the Supplemental Decree. Mr. Jones has
taken this appeal from the District Court's allowing her to exercise the same amount of
parent-time she had exercised in Monroe in Moab.
II.

FACTS

The parties are formerly husband and wife who were divorced by a bifurcated
decree of divorce entered by the Seventh District Court of Grand County. ROA 167-69.
At the time of the Bench Trial and the Supplemental Decree of Divorce was entered, Mr.
Jones lived in St. George and Autem lived in Moab. ROA 259, Transcript of Trial, page
53, lines 16-21. The Trial Court awarded the parties joint legal custody of their three
children and Mr. Jones physical custody of the children following a bench trial held in
December 2011. ROA 245-48, 259-60. Autem was "awarded parent time consistent
with Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-37", and "if Autem moves to St. George or if the parties
otherwise live within a reasonable distance of each other, Autem shall have parent time
consistent with Utah Code § 30-3-35". ROA 260. Mr. Jones remarried and moved to
Monroe, Utah.
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Transcript, page 76, lines 3-6.

Autem then moved to Monroe.

Transcript, page 70, line 4.

Mr. Jones initially denied Autem § 1 30-3-35 visitation.

Transcript, page 87, line 21 to page 88, line 9.

In a joint stipulation and motion to

transfer the matter to the Sixth District Court of Sevier County the parties stated "[t]his
motion is based on the grounds that both parties have relocated and currently reside in
Monroe, Sevier County, Utah". ROA 308, included in the Addendum.
Even after moving to Monroe, Autem was forced to file an order to show cause to
secure the § 30-3-35 visitation awarded to her by the Supplemental Decree. ROA 31516. The District Court ultimately entered its Order on Order to Show Cause and found
Autem "relocated to Monroe" and awarded her visitation pursuant to § 30-3-35. ROA
380-82.

The District Court, in its May 6, 2013 Order on Order to Show Cause,

awarded Autem "as much parent-time as possible" and required the majority of her
parent-time take place in Sevier County with visitation outside Sevier County "for special
occasions." ROA 381. No part of the Order on Order to Show Cause, including the
finding that Autem had relocated to Monroe, was appealed.
On March 26, 2014, Autem filed a motion captioned as a petition to modify
requesting that she be allowed to exercise her parent-time under the Order on Order to
Show Cause in Moab rather than Monroe. ROA 425. She did not ask for an enlargement
of parent-time or a change in physical custody.

She cited the continuation of and

development of her relationship with her now husband, including plans to marry; her fulltime job in Moab; the financial difficulty of maintaining a home in Monroe; the
Unless otherwise noted, all references to § or section are to the applicable section
of the Utah Code.

1
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proximity of her family in Moab and Blanding and their relationship with the children;
and the only slightly larger travel burden as compared with the travel burden imposed
under the Supplemental Decree as reasons supporting the motion. ROA 424-25. She
asked the District Court "[d]espite [Moab] being over 150 miles [from Monroe that] the
Court depart from the 'minimum requirements for parent-time with a school-age child' to
fashion a parent-time schedule equivalent to that available under Utah Code § 30-3-35".
ROA424.
At the April 7, 2014 bench trial, Autem argued the development of her
relationship with her now husband was progressing toward marriage and she wanted to
have parent-time in Moab so her children could become better acquainted with him, and
that allowing her to have parent-time in Moab would lessen the financial burden on her
and allow the children to further develop a relationship with her family. Transcript, page
16, lines 1-17; page 18, lines 7-13; page 108, lines 4-17. Autem also argued that
regardless of the modification standard that the Court should interpret the phrase 'within
a reasonable distance' to find the distance between Monroe and Moab was a reasonable
distance. Transcript, page 16, line 18 to page 17, line 25; See page 70, lines 12-16 (''we
would probably better clarify [the motion] as a request for the Court to clarify what the
decree means" and ''what Judge Anderson contemplated was simply a travel burden");
See also page 112, lines 11-14 ("if the Court is not inclined to address the visitation in

Moab as a ... petition to modify [issue], we would ask for directions from the Court as a
clarification of what a reasonable distance is"); page 113, lines 17-22 (the court does not
necessary "have to find that there has been a material change in circumstance", ''we're
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simply asking the Court to interpret the decree to its logical end, which is that there's a
certain amount of travel imposed on the parties and their children"). As support, Autem
argued that the travel burden imposed under the Supplement Decree was the equivalent
of twenty-five visits of her living in Moab and Mr. Jones living in Monroe. Transcript,
page 17, lines 2-25. Autem also relied on the request set out in the petition to modify that
the District Court had discretion to give her visitation similar to § 30-3-35 pursuit to§ 303-37.
Autem testified that the two older children had attended school in Moab, had
friends that lived in Moab and that she had two sisters and an aunt with children who are
friends to the parties' children. Transcript, page 72, lines 6-23; page 80, line 5 ("they
have a lot of friends in Moab). Autem and her now husband testified they planned to
become engaged and marry. Transcript, page 56, lines 19-20; page 80, lines 21-23.
Autem testified that she wanted§ 30-3-35 visitation in Moab "[s]o that me and the boys
can be with Steven [(her husband)] on the weekends, so that we are a family on the
weekends that we are together." Transcript page 89, lines 4-8. She testified prior to Mr.
Jones' move to Monroe the parties exchanged the children halfway between St. George
and Moab in Salina or Richfield. Transcript page 75, line 15-25.

She testified the

distance from Monroe to Moab is 186 miles. Transcript page 79, lines 2-9. Autem also
testified about the cost of maintaining a residence in Monroe. Transcript page 93, line 20
to page 94, line 7 (an average of $800 to $900 per month).
driving to Monroe was $80. Transcript page 94, lines 15-18.
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She testified the cost of

Autem further testified that her work was seasonal and that her income was
minimal from October to March - $500 to $1,200 per month. Transcript, page 62, lines
8-25. The parties testified thousands of dollars in medical bills had been incurred for
their children. See for example Transcript, page 27, line 2 ("amount due is $1,126.76);
page 28, line 20 ("[l]ong cast for a total of $163"); page 29, lines 2-4 ("amount due is
three thousand [] three hundred dollars and forty-three cents"); page 31, lines 13-14
("amount due of $163.57"); page 65, line 10-12 (total charges are $7,151). Mr. Jones'
accepted proffer of testimony was that his income had dropped from $3,891 at the time of
Supplemental Decree (ROA 260) to $2,054. Transcript, page 5, lines 15-19. He also
testified that his mother had paid his half of the children's medical expenses. Transcript,
page 40, line 23.
In his closing arguments, Mr. Jones' counsel acknowledged § 30-3-37 applied to
situations where parents live far apart (Transcript page 96, line 17-19) and that "Section
37 contemplated for long distance" parent-time, although he advocated for the minimum
visitation under§ 30-3-37. Transcript page 117, lines 6-8, see also Transcript page 118,
line 10, lines 13-14 ("I will just say the statute is what it is" and "[u]nder 37 you get one
weekend a month ...").
In its oral decision, the District Court found "by a preponderance of the evidence
that the [] factors dictate that it's in the best interests of the kids to have standard
visitation" and "that visitation take place in [] Moab rather than Monroe." Transcript,
page 123, lines 21-24.
In its written Conclusions of Law, the District Court concluded:
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I. Autem' s relocation to Moab and the additional financial needs of the children are
material and substantial changes in circumstance that warrant modifying Autem' s
parent-time schedule to permit visitation in Moab, Utah pursuant to Utah Code §
30-3-35. ROA 449.
2. It is in the best interests of the children that visitation with Ms. Jones take place in
Moab rather than Monroe. ROA 449.
3. Utah Code § 30-3-37 provides the Courts discretion to deviate from the visitation
schedule provided therein for school-aged children and doing so is in the best
interests of the parties' children. ROA 449.
4. Modification of the parent time schedule for the parties and the children based on
Petitioner now living in Moab and Respondent living in Monroe is subject to a
lesser showing of material changes of because the Supplemental Decree allowed
for visitation under Utah Code § 30-3-35 if the parties lived within a reasonable
distance of each other and did not incorporate the 150 mile rule found in Utah
Code§ 30-3-37. ROA 449-50.
The District Court made the following written findings of fact pertinent to this
appeal:
1. This Court, as part of an order on an order to show cause ("Order"), determined
that Autem had established residency in Monroe, that the parties lived within a
reasonable distance of one another, and awarded her "as much parent-time as
possible", including parent-time under Utah Code§ 30-3-35. ROA 447.
2. Autem is now a resident of Moab. ROA 447.

•M•M ...h - -
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3. Moab is 186 miles from Monroe, Utah. ROA 447.
4. The majority of this distance is along Interstate 70 and travel from Monroe to
Moab poses a lesser burden than traveling 150 miles in a metropolitan area during
heavy traffic, e.g. Santaquin to Logan. ROA 44 7.
5. The time to travel from Moab to Monroe or vice versa does not represent an
unreasonable travel time. ROA 44 7.
6. The distance and time each party would travel in a typical month that includes two
visits is only slightly greater than the travel anticipated for the single visit
anticipated by the Supplemental Decree (339 miles vs. 372 miles). ROA 447.
7. At the time of this hearing Autem continued to maintain a residence in Monroe for
the purpose of exercising her parent-time visitation under Utah Code § 30-3-35.
ROA 447.
8. Autem pays rent of $500.00 per month for her home in Monroe plus utilities. ROA
447.
9. Since entry of the Order the parties have incurred additional expenses for the
children, particularly in the form of medical expenses that are not insignificant and
now the parties both require additional income to support children. ROA 448.
IO.Maintenance of a second home by either party is an unnecessary use of finances
that could otherwise be better used for the benefit of the parties' children. ROA
448.

10 IP age

11. Autem would have additional financial flexibility by not maintaining a residence
in Monroe to meet the needs of her children, including payment of medical costs.
ROA448.
12. The children are two years older than at the time of entry of the Supplemental
Decree and travel between Monroe and Moab is less of a hardship on them. ROA
448.
13. The children have significant relationships with family and friends in Moab and
Southeastern Utah, including grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, and friends.
ROA448.
14. Autem began dating her boyfriend, Steven Hirschfeld, over one year ago and the
two now live together in Moab. ROA 448.
15.Autem and Mr. Hirschfeld have plans to marry. ROA 448.
16. Visitation in Moab will allow the children to spend time around Mr. Hirschfeld.
ROA448.
17.Ms. Jones works in Moab full-time and lives there full-time with Mr. Hirschfeld
except when she has visitation with her children. ROA 448.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I.

The District Court's decision awarding Autem § 30-3-35 parent-time to be

exercised in Moab, a distance of more than 150 miles from Monroe, should be upheld on
the alternative ground that the District Court exercised its discretion under § 30-3-37(3)
enlarge the minimum visitation. While Mr. Jones appeals the District Court's decision on
the grounds that a substantial and material change in circumstance took place and it is in

• •~
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the best interests of the children to have parent-time with Autem in Moab, he wholly
failed to address the District Court's independent grounds under its authority in § 30-337. This is fatal to his appeal. The District Court expressly cited its authority under§ 303-37 in paragraph 8 of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. It undertook the
same analysis required by § 30-3-37(5) in fashioning its parent-time and travel cost
allocation order. Mr. Jones continuously advocated for the application of § 30-3-37
although he failed to appreciate the discretion given the District Court. Accordingly,
because the District Court based its decision on the alternative grounds of its discretion
under § 30-3-37 and because Mr. Jones fails to address this in his appeal, the District
Court's decision should be upheld.
II.

Mr. Jones' argument that the District erred because the material changes it

found were contemplated by the Supplemental Decree and/or Order on Order to Show
Cause includes no citation to the record or either document. The test for whether a matter
has been contemplated is whether the "decree and record are bereft of any reference to
the changed circumstance at issue." Cantrell v. Cantrell, 2013 UT App 296,

1 19, 323

P.3d 586. If so, the change was not contemplated. Id. Rule 24(a)(9) of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure places the burden on Mr. Jones to cite to the portion of the record he
relied on. He cannot simply state the matter was previously considered without citation
to the source of this contention. For this reason, his appeal fails based on insufficient
briefing.
III.

The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it found material and

substantial changes in circumstances sufficient to find it would be in the children's best

,,,.,.,.,w,,.,..,w,M,,., .., _ _ _ _ _ ,.
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interests to have parent-time with Autem in Moab. In this case, Autem simply asked the
District Court to change the location of her parent-time from Monroe to Moab. She did
not request a change in physical custody and she did not request more parent-time. The
substantial and material modification standard is flexible enough to accommodate
proposed changes ranging from a wholesale change in physical custody to a change in
location of parent-time. In this case, while Autem's desire to Move to Moab full-time,
have her children interact more with her now husband, allow her children to spend time
with her family, and free up financial resources to better provide for her children would
not likely be sufficient under a proposed modification to change physical custody, it is
more than sufficient to reach this issue of a change in the location of existing parent-time.
None of the substantial and material changes cited by the District Court at the bench trial
or in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were contemplated by the Order on
Order to Show Cause.

Each affects the basis underlying the most recent order and

satisfies the first prong of the modification standard.
IV.

The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it held the

preponderance of the evidence demonstrated it would be in the best interest of the
children to exercise § 30-3-35 visitation in Moab. Mr. Jones argues that the District
Court "neglected to address the impact that the travel would have on the children and
their lives", including the danger and cost of travel. Brief, page 20-1. Mr. Jones failed to
adequately brief his argument. Mr. Jones includes no citation to the record for these
contentions and he did not present these to the District Court. Even if he had satisfied his
briefing burden and not sought to introduce evidence for the first time on appeal, the
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District Court did not abuse its discretion. The District Court's findings sufficiently
support its conclusion that Autem had satisfied her burden to continue her parent-time in
Moab rather than Monroe and that this was in the best interests of the children. The
District Court found that Autem had exercised all parent-time available to her since her
move to Monroe, that the travel burden did not materially exceed that contemplated by
the Supplemental Decree, that the travel time between Monroe and Moab is not
unreasonable, that the parties' financial situation would benefit from Autem no longer
living in Monroe, and that their extended familial ties would benefit from visitation in
Moab. Mr. Jones offered no testimony that parent-time in Moab was harmful to the
children.
V.

Alternatively, the language of the parties' Supplemental Decree of Divorce

awarding Appellee § 30-3-35 parent-time "if the parties otherwise live within a
reasonable distance of each other" was capable of being interpreted to find the distance
between Monroe and Moab was reasonable. While not a separate ground for its decision,
it is within this Court's ability to uphold a decision on a matter on which it was not
decided. This issue was presented to the District Court and thus apparent in the record.
The District Court's award of§ 30-3-35 parent-time to Autem in Moab is approximately
equivalent to the travel burden imposed on the parties and their children while Autem
lived in St. George and Tim lived in Moab.

It follows that reasonable must mean

something other than 150 miles as provided in § 30-3-37 and the that the District Court,
weighing all evidence before it, could have reached its decision on the grounds that the
distance from Monroe to Moab is reasonable.

14 IP age

VI.

Mr. Jones should be required to pay attorney's fees and costs of this appeal

pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure or§ 30-3-3.

ARGUMENT.

I.

It was Unnecessary for The District Court to Find a Material and
Substantial Change in Circumstance and the Decision Should be
Affirmed on Alternative Grounds that Autem Relocated Pursuant to §
30-3-37 and the Award of§ 30-3-35 Visitation in Moab was in the
Children's Best Interests.

The District Court's decision to award Appellee parent time under § 30-3-35
should be upheld on the un-appealed alternative ground that § 30-3-37 provided it
discretion to enlarge visitation beyond the minimum schedule provided in § 30-3-37(6)
once it found Autem intended to relocate to Moab. An appellate court ''will not reverse a
ruling of the trial court that rests on independent alternative grounds where the appellant
challenges only one of those grounds." Salt Lake County v. Butler, Crockett, & Walsh

Dev. Corp., 2013 UT App 30,

1 28 (internal citations omitted).

In this case, Mr. Jones

challenges the District Court's decision to allow § 30-3-35 visitation in Moab only based
on its determination that a material and substantial change in circumstance had occurred.
He fails altogether to challenge the District Court's exercise of its discretion under§ 303-37 to enlarge parent-time under the relocation statue following its determination Autem
had relocated to Moab from Monroe. Accordingly, his appeal must fail.
The District Court made its decision to allow Autem § 30-3-35 parent-time on the
alternative ground that § 30-3-37(3) provides the court discretion to deviate from the
minimum visitation scheduled provided in § 30-3-37(6). Once notice of relocation is
given, either party or the court may then schedule a hearing to review the "relocation and
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parent-time schedule as provided in Section 30-3-35 and make appropriate orders
regarding the parent-time and costs for parent-time transportation." § 30-3-37(3). The
statute further provides "minimum requirements for parent-time" "[u]nless otherwise
ordered by the court." § 30-3-37(6). All that is necessary to trigger the statute is a
proposed relocation of 150 miles by one parent from the residence of the other parent.
"If the court finds that the relocation is in the best interest of the child, the court shall

determine the parent-time schedule and allocate the transportation costs. . ." by
considering ''the reason for the relocation", ''the additional costs or difficulty to both
parents in exercising parent-time", ''the economic resources of both parents", and any
other "necessary and relevant" factor. § 30-3-37(5).
In this matter, it is evident that the District Court treated Autem's petition to
modify in part as a notice of relocation. Autem specifically requested the District Court
deviate from the minimum schedule under the relocation statue in her motion captioned
as a petition to modify. ROA 424. In its written conclusions of law, the District Court
concluded "§ 30-3-37 provides the Court discretion to deviate from the visitation
schedule provided therein for school-aged child and doing so is in the best interest of the
parties' children." ROA 459.

Mr. Jones' counsel repeatedly argued for minimum

visitation under§ 30-3-37. Transcript page 117, lines 6-8, see also Transcript page 118,
line 10, lines 13-14. The District Court's conclusion is supported by its findings of fact
that Autem now lived in Moab, that Moab was more than 150 miles from Monroe, and
that visitation in Moab would allow the children to spend additional time with Autem's
now husband and other family members. The District Court had previously found Autem
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had "relocated to Monroe" (ROA 381) and thus no other finding was necessary to trigger
the application of§ 30-3-37.

The District Court found parent-time visitation in Moab

was in the children's best interest. Transcript, page 123, lines 21-24 ("I find by a
preponderance of evidence that the [] factors dictate that it's in the best interests of the
kids that they have standard visitation ... in Moab rather than Monroe").
Further, the District Court orally noted "under the relocation statute the Court can
allocate relocation expense[] [a]nd the Court finds that it's appropriate in this case..."
Transcript, page 125, lines 2-3. The District Court undertook almost the exact analysis
contemplated by § 30-3-37(5) when it heard evidence on the reason for the relocation,
discussed in great detail the cost and difficulty to both parents in exercising parent-time
and made an adjustment to the travel schedule to favor Mr. Jones, and considered the
finances of the parties in light of medical concerns for their children. In doing so, the
District Court considered the reason for the relocation, costs of exercising parent-time,
financial resources of the parties, and other relevant factors, including the children's ties
to extended family. By enacting § 30-3-37, the legislature identified a change in
circumstance sufficient to alter both parent-time and physical custody. It also provided a
specific means to accommodate the relocation of either the custodial or non-custodial
parent.

Mr. Jones argues that Autem "never truly resided in Monroe." Brief, page 19.

However, this is contrary to the un-appealed finding of the District Court in its May 6,
2013 Order on Order to Show Cause and the November 19, 2012 stipulation of the
parties' through prior counsel that "both parties have relocated and currently reside in
Monroe." See Dode v. Cude, 710 P.2d 170, 171 (Utah 1985) ("We have previously stated
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that parties are bound by their stipulations unless relieved therefrom by the court, which
has the power to set aside a stipulation entered into inadvertently or for justifiable cause"
and "[i]t is unlikely that a stipulation signed by counsel and filed with the court was
entered into inadvertently") (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Mr. Jones has

never sought to withdraw his stipulation. Furthermore, Mr. Jones is now foreclosed from
appealing the Order on Order to Show Cause by operation of Rule 4 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Similar to § 30-3-35, in establishing a minimum schedule, the
legislature extended latitude to district courts in fashioning parent time awards that are in
the best interests of the children. Accordingly, because Mr. Jones fails to challenge the
District Court decision on the alternative ground that Autem's relocation was in the best
interests of the children and ordered parent-time in excess of the minimum requirements,
his appeal must be denied.
II.

Mr. Jones Failed to Demonstrate the Material Changes of
Circumstances Cited by the District Court were Previously
Contemplated in the Record or an Order

The District Court did not abuse its broad discretion in identifying material change
in circumstance sufficient to allow for § 30-3-35 visitation to continue between Autem
and her children in Moab. Mr. Jones articulates the necessary standard to support a
modification, but fails entirely to address the standard for assessing whether the proposed
change was in fact previously contemplated by the district court. "In order for a material
change in circumstances to be contemplated in a divorce decree there must be evidence,
preferably in the form of a provision within the decree itself, that the trial court
anticipated the specific change." Cantrell v. Cantrell, 2013 UT App 296,
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19 (internal

citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in the original). "Thus, if both the divorce
decree and the record are bereft of any reference to the changed circumstance at issue in
the petition to modify, then the subsequent changed circumstance was not contemplated
in the original divorce decree." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). A party's
argument must include not only "the contentions and reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented", but "citations to ... parts of the record relied on."
URAP 24(a)(9). This Court is not required to shoulder the "burden of argument and
research."

State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (internal citations and

quotations omitted).
Mr. Jones argues that "[a]t the time of trial on her Petition to Modify, there had

been no material change of circumstances, unanticipated at the time of the entry of the
Supplemental Decree or Order On Order to Show Cause, sufficient to support a
modification of the parent time provision of the Supplemental Decree and order on Order
to Show Cause." Brief, page 16. Mr. Jones argues that "[t]he children growing older and
their increasing maturity was a change clearly anticipated by both parties at the time of
the Supplemental Decree and subsequent orders." Brief, page 18. Mr. Jones, however,
has failed to cite to any part of the record demonstrating the Trial Court or District Court
had previously considered this issue in connection with an award of parent-time or that
either the Supplemental Decree or Order on Order to Show Cause linked parent-time to
this or any other material change identified by the District Court. In fact, Mr. Jones fails
to cite any part of the record showing either of the district courts considering the matter
had considered any of the other reasons identified by the District Court as material and

- - -
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substantial changes in circumstances. Because only a reference in the record or in a
decree or similar document is necessary to establish that a proposed substantial and
material change had previously been considered, Mr. Jones has failed in his duty to
demonstrate this and his appeal should fail for not adequately briefing the issue.

III.

The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion when it Modified its
Order On Order to Show Cause to Allow Autem to exercise § 30-3-35
Parent-Time in Moab

Even if this Court were to hold that a substantial and material change in
circumstance were necessary to allow Autem to maintain visitation under § 30-3-35,
sufficient evidence was presented for the District Court to find the same and evidence
was presented that an extension of visitation under§ 30-3-35 owing to Autem's move to
Moab was in the children's best interests. "Before modifying a custody order, the court
conducts a bifurcated inquiry to determine, first, if there has been a substantial and
material change in the circumstances upon which the award was based, and, if so,
whether a modification is in the best interests of the child." Hudema v. Carpentar, 1999
UT App 290,

,r 22;

see also Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 53-4 (Utah 1982).

"The

change necessary to justify a modification of a decree of divorce varies with the type of
modification contemplated." Whitehorse v. Whitehorse, 790 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah App.
1990). In this case, the District Court properly undertook a substantial and modification
analysis based on the requested modification.
As a preliminary matter, the Hogge modification analysis is far more flexible than
suggested by Mr. Jones.

It can accommodate both the typical proposed change in

physical custody, but also the less typical proposed change in parent time. This is

'"•-•·••· ............. _,_, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .............. •-•••,h«,•· .......
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illustrated by the case of Becker v. Becker. 694 P.2d 608 (Utah 1984). Becker addressed
an appeal from the decision of the district court declining to find a material and
substantial change in circumstance to reopen the issue of custody, but nonetheless
sufficient to modify parent-time. Id. at 611. The Becker Court specifically determined:
[i]t is clear, then, that a specific change in circumstances may justify
reconsideration of one provision of a divorce decree while not justifying
reconsideration of another provision. Having found a material change with
respect to visitation, the judge then determined that the visitation
arrangements should be modified. Id. at 611.
In this case, unlike any case cited by Mr. Jones or located by counsel, Autem did
not seek a change in physical custody, or even parent-time for that matter. She merely
asked the District Court to change the location of her § 30-3-35 visitation to Moab to
allow her children to become better acquainted with her now husband, to preserve her
finances, and to allow her children to develop a relationship with her family members in
southeastern Utah. While the material changes of circumstance articulated by the District
Court would have most likely failed to satisfy the heavy burden for a change in physical
custody, similar to Becker, they do justify reconsideration of the location of Aute_m's §
30-3-35 visitation - the only proposed modification. The District Court was well within
its broad discretion in considering and ultimately finding Autem' s proposed relocation,
that the parties' need for additional finances that would be served by allowing Autem §
30-3-35 parent-time in Moab, the children's ability to handle the increased travel burden,
and the relationship of the children with extended family members in finding a
substantial and material change in circumstance.
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The substantial and material changes relied on by the District Court were not
contemplated in its earlier Order on Order to Show Cause. The Order on Order to Show
Cause identifies several reasons for the decision to award Autem § 30-3-35 parent-time in
Monroe. First, the District Court cited the ''within a reasonable distance" language found
in the Supplemental decree and found this was to avoid the need for modification if
Autem relocated. ROA 380. Second, the District Court noted the parties' stipulation
transferring venue established Sevier County as their residences and that Autem had
relocated to Monroe. Third, the District Court found Mr. Jones had agreed to§ 30-3-35
parent-time if Autem moved closer to the children.

Several of these changed in the

interim period. First, Autem no longer proposed to live in Monroe. While the situation
was financially and personally workable at the time of the Order on Order to Show
Cause, it became increasingly difficult because of her financial situation, medical
expenses for her children, and her desire for her children to spend additional time with
her now husband in anticipation of their marriage. Second, Mr. Jones no longer agreed to
§ 30-3-35 parent-time if Autem were to exercise parent-time in Moab. Third, no court

had ever been asked to construe the ''within a reasonable distance" language contained in
the Supplemental Decree. It was and is likely someplace beyond 150 miles; otherwise,
the Trial Court would be attempting to impose a burden not countenanced by the
legislature without articulating a basis for it.
As argued elsewhere, Mr. Jones' argument against the age of the children, the
relocation, and mounting medical expenses as being material and substantial changes in
circumstances fails. Nowhere has Mr. Jones cited to the record or an order that indicates
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the children's advancing age was a consideration in awarding parent-time to Autem or
that the parties' finances were a consideration. Not only has Mr. Jones failed to appeal
the finding in the Order on Order to Show Cause that Autem lived in Monroe, but acting
through his counsel, he stipulated to this. It is disingenuous for him to now argue
"Autem had never truly resided in Monroe" when he stipulated to this very fact in
December 2013. Brief, page 19. Finally, the parties' medical expenses are "significant in
relation to the modification being sought." Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197, 200 (Utah
1985). Autem's requested modification would allow her to dispense with her home in
Monroe. The corresponding cost savings was $500 to $800 per month. Mr. Jones went
to great lengths to establish the burden of medical expenses, his drop in income, and even
acknowledged his mother paid for his portion of the medical bills. Further, the District
Court found the parties finances were respectively $2,054 for Mr. Jones and $1,700 for
Autem.

Given Autem's child support was adjusted to $505 per month and in

combination with the other factors supporting the material change in circumstance, the
District Court's action was far from being so flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of
discretion. Instead, it was a logical extension of the available facts and a determination
of the important role Autem plays in the boys' lives. It is significant since bears directly
on Autem's finances and her ability to provide for her children while maintaining a
meaningful presence in their lives.
IV.
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The District Court Properly Held It Was In The Best Interests of the
Parties' Children for Autem to Exercise Visitation in Moab

Mr. Jones' claim that the District Court erred in its best interest analysis by not
considering the impact of travel on the parties' children must fail since this argument is
made for the first time on appeal. "[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue
must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to
rule on that issue." Pratt v. Nelson, 2001 UT 41,

,r

15, 164 P.3d 366. Unless an

exception applies, "[t]his Court will not consider an issues raised for the first time on
appeal." Harris v. Springville City, 712 P.2d 188, 189 (Utah 1984). Mr. Jones brief
includes no argument for an exception.
Mr. Jones provides no citation to any source for his contention that the purpose of
§ 30-3-37 "is to allow the children to be in one home, one community, one environment

most of the time, while allowing them to also spend as much time with the non-custodial
parent as is reasonably possible." Brief, page 21. He has failed to adequately brief this
issue under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is just as likely that §
30-3-37 was structured to allow flexibility in determining visitation because otherwise a
non-custodial parent 151 miles from the other would have the same visitation as a noncustodial parent 10,151 miles from the other. To extent Mr. Jones is correct that the
purpose is to allow the "children to spend as much time with the non-custodial parent as
is reasonably possible", than the Court should find that the current visitation is reasonable
as it allows for this.
Mr. Jones argues that "[t]raveling from Monroe to Moab every other weekend will
greatly limit the children's opportunities to participate in sports and other activities, peer
activities and social events, church and scouting events, and similar activities." Brief,

-------···-·-······-·-······
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page 21. Mr. Jones further argues "[p]utting the children on the highway every other
weekend greatly increases the possibility of injury or death due to an automobile
accident", the children are exhausted when they return home, and it imposes an
unreasonable financial burden on Mr. Jones. Regardless of the merit of these arguments,
no evidence was set forth by Mr. Jones regarding any of these issues. There was no
testimony about sports, church, or scouting, or more importantly, why such activities
outweigh the constitutionally protected interest Autem has in raising her children. No
testimony was elicited about the danger or travel or Mr. Jones' plan to minimize this for
the children where they most likely will travel for sports, peer, church, and scouting
activities. In essence, Mr. Jones is simply saying travel for parent-time visitation is
inherently dangerous while other forms of travel, travel that does not involve being with
Autem, is not. While the District Court gave Mr. Jones an opportunity to address these
concerns when it ask if the burden of travel was greater than in rush hour traffic, his
counsel only stated his concern was ''the impact and disruption that's going to have on
the kids' lives."

Transcript, page 118, lines 13-17.

Finally, Mr. Jones has never

quantified the economic cost to him of traveling to Moab and this is wholly lacking from
the record. Without evidence of the cost, it is simply not credible that he "spends a large
percentage of child support ... on fuel." Even if he does, this is a collateral consequence
of divorce that he cannot escape. However, the District Court did consider the costs to
each party. It adjusted the cost by allocating to Autem the burden of all travel every
fourth weekend visit.
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Even if he had satisfied his briefing burden and not sought to introduce evidence
for the first time on appeal, the District Court did not abuse its discretion. The District
Court did explore the impact travel would have on the children and ultimately found
"[t]hey're more able to travel." Transcript, page 123, lines 12, 13; page 117, line 12 to
page 118, line 12. The District Court's findings sufficiently support its conclusion that
Autem had satisfied her burden to continue her parent-time in Moab rather than Monroe
and that this was in the best interests of the children. The District Court found that
Autem had exercised all parent-time available to her since her move .to Monroe, that the
travel burden did not materially exceed that contemplated by the Supplemental Decree,
that the travel time between Monroe and Moab is not unreasonable and the boys are
better suited to handled any added burden because of their age, that the parties' financial
situation would benefit from Autem no longer living in Monroe, and that their extended
familial ties would benefit from visitation in Moab. This decision is consistent with the
Order on Order to Show Cause's instruction that Autem "have as much parent-time as
possible". ROA 381.
V.

The District Court's Decision can be Substantiated as an Appropriate
Interpretation of the Parties' Supplemental Decree of Divorce.

Finally, the District Court's decision is sustainable on alternative grounds not in
the record, but set forth by Autem that the District Court should interpret the 'within
reasonable distance' language of the Supplemental Decree to mean the distance between
Moab and Monroe. In the absence of alternative grounds set forth in the record, "an
appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal
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ground or theory apparent on the record." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ,r 13 (emphasis
in the original, internal citations and quotations omitted).

A decree of divorce is

interpreted using the "established rules of contract interpretation." Moon v. Moon, 1999
UT App 012,

,r 18, 973 P.2d 431.

The reasoning of the Tennessee Court of Appeals is

persuasive in this case. When presented with the task of interpreting 'reasonable' tuition
in a decree, the court first noted the use of reasonable does not create ambiguity.

Hathaway v. Hathaway, 98 SW.3d 675, 679 (Tenn. App. 2002). The Hathaway Court
went on to hold that" '[r]easonable' in this case must be viewed in light of the parties'
situation at the time of the divorce." Id. at 680.
In this case, Autem requested that the District Court interpret the phrase
"otherwise lives within a reasonable distance of each other" to impose a travel burden on
the parties' and their children. Autem set out evidence of the distance between Moab and
St. George, the distance between Moab and Monroe, and that the travel burden initially
placed on the parties by the Trial Court under the minimum parent time schedule in § 303-37( 6) is equivalent to twenty five Monroe to Moab visits. It follows that reasonable
must mean something other than 150 miles as provided in § 30-3-37 and the that the
District Court, weighing all evidence before it, could have reached its decision on the
grounds that the distance from Monroe to Moab is reasonable. This is further buttressed
by the strong policy in § 30-3-33 (allowing for accommodations to the parent-time
schedule) and§ 30-3-34 (allowing for a departure from the minimum guidelines).
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VI.

Mr. Jones Should be Ordered to Pay Attorney Fees and Costs.

Mr. Jones should be ordered to pay attorney fees and costs under either Rule 33.

Rule 33 allows an award of attorney fees and costs when a party has filed a frivolous
motion or a motion for delay.
[A] frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good
faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one
interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless
increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party
filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
"[S]anctions should be imposed when an appeal is obviously without any merit and has
been taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and results in delayed
implementation of the judgment of the lower court; increased costs of litigation; and
dissipation of the time and resources of the Law Court." Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365,
369 (Utah App. 1988).
Mr. Jones' appeal is frivolous and interposed for the purpose of harassing Autem

and needlessly increasing the cost of litigation.

Mr. Jones filed this appeal with

knowledge of Autem's limited finances where she disclosed these at the bench trial. Mr.
Jones knew from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the District Court had
entered its decision on alternative ground. However, he failed to appeal on these grounds
and solely focused on the District Court's application of the material and substantial
change standard. As a result, his appeal has no chance of succeeding. Further, Mr.
Jones' argument for abuse fails to account for the modified standard of the substantial
and material change standard based on the requested modification. He failed to carry his

burden to adequately brief several of the issues by not citing to any portion of the record
to support his claims. For example, he failed to identify where either the Trial Court or
District Court had previously contemplated the changes presented by Autem supporting
her petition to modify. He seeks to introduce evidence about the dangers of traveling to
Moab, the harm to children, etc, and raise issues never brought before the District Court.
He argued the "trial court found a change of circumstances where nothing had changed"
despite the fact that he had stipulated to the District Court this exact thing and not
appealed the Order On Order to Show Cause. He has done all of this ostensibly to
prevent the children from seeing their mother one weekend a month.

To preserve the

already limited time she has with her children, Autem has been forced to defend this
action.

This is an egregious case of a custodial parent who refuses to accept any

meaningful involvement of the non-custodial parent in the lives of the children. This is
born out not only by this appeal, but by Mr. Jones refusal to allow Autem § 30-3-35
visitation even after she moved to Monroe. By awarding fees, this Court reaffirms that
appeals should not be taken lightly and also that a custodial parent is required to accept
the inconveniences that sometimes accompany that responsibility.
(Continued Below)
II
II
II
II
II
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CONCLUSION

Both because of failure to address the alternative grounds for its decision and
because the District Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Autem simply
changing the location where Autem could exercise her parent-time, this Court should
uphold the District Court's decision.
~

DATED thisr day of June, 2015.

301Page

CERTIFICA1E OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(f)(l)

I certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation found in Rule
24(f)(l) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and contains 8,210 words not including
the table of authorities or table of contents and addenda. I further certify that this brief
has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2010 in
Times New Roman with a 13 point font.

~·\cz
j;

Peterson
ATTORNEY FOR Appellee

31

IP age

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

:!itt-

1 certify that on June.2'1, 2015, I served a copy of the forgoing Brief:
Brent Brindley
Brindley Sullivan
By email: brenbrindley@infowest.com
50 East 100 South, Suite 302
St. George, UT 84770
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street, 5th Floor
PO Box 140320
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230
(Original plus 7 copies)
By email: courtofappeals@utcourts.gov

Y FOR Appellee

321 Page

ADDENDUM
Stipulation and Motion for Change of Venue
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AUTEM JONES,
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TIMOTHY KEITH JONES,
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)
}
)

STIPULATION AND
MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE
Case No. 104700041
Judge: Lyle R. Anderson

The parties, pursuant to UCA § 78B-3-308, hereby stipulate and move the Court for its
order changing venue and transferring this case to the Sixth District Court, Sevier County, State
of Utah, for further proceedings. This motion is based·on the grounds that boili parties baye

relocated and currently reside in Monroe, Sevier County, Utah.
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